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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE PARIS COMPANY and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Plaintiffs,
Supreme Court No. 15882

-vs-

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH and J. BRENT
CHRISTENSON,
Defendants.

NEBO SCHOOL DISTRICT and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Plaintiffs,
Supreme Court No. 15881

-vs-

JOAN CRAGUN and THE
INDUSTRIAL Cm1MISSION OF
UTAH,
Defendants.

PATRICIA H. WHITE,
Plaintiff,
-vs-

Supreme Court No. 15796

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH, ST. BENEDICT'S HOSPITAL
and PACIFIC EMPLOYER'S
USUR.Z\NCE COMPANY,
Defendants.

BRIEP OF DEFENDANT ON APPEAL
INDUSTRIAL C0"!.'1ISSION
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NATURE OF THE CASES
These cases involve the interpretation of Section 35-1-69
u.c.A. 1953, as it pertains to apportionment of medical expenses
and compensation between the Second Injury Fund and the insurance carriers for the employers.

These three cases request

apportionment of temporary total benefits, and medical expenses
incurred before and after a determination has been made for permanent partial disability.
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
The Commission ruled that under the circumstances of these
particular cases there should be no apportionment of temporary
total benefits and medical expenses.

Petitions for Writ of Re-

view in each case bring these matters before this Court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant on appeal, Industrial Commission of Utah, seeks
an affirmance of the rulings of the Industrial Commission.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
RE:

JOAN CRAGUN
Nebo School District and State Insurance Fund.
Industrial Commission adopts facts as related by Plain-

tiff's on Appeal.
RE:

PARIS CO. AND STATE INSURANCE fl!ND
Defendant Industrial Commission adopts facts as related

in Brief of Defendant on Appeal J. Brent Christenson.
RE:

PATRICIA H. WHITE
Defendant Industrial Commission

adopts

facts

as
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related by Plaintiff's on Appeal with the addition of a finding
of the medical panel that the patient was "to some extent, better
off by having the condition taken care of and stabilized."
POINT I.
RELEVANCY OF ORTEGA DECISION
As the three cases combined in this appeal all rely upon
Intermountain Health Care Inc. v. Ortega, 562 P.2 617

(Utah

1977), it is necessary to discuss the relevancy of that case.
These three cases are only the tip of the iceberg of the dozens
of cases already before the commission, before this court or
simply biding time to see what action this case and others before
the court will produce.

As all use Qrtega as their legal author-

ity it is important we first briefly review the Ortega decision.
Plaintiffs' on appeal argue that Ortega is the precedent
for apportionment of temporary total compensation, for apportionment of medical expenses during temporary total disability and
for the definition of "substantially greater."

These thre_e areas

will be discussed separately under Points of Argument.
It is important, however, to first evaluate what occurred
in Ortega before logical conclusions can be made on any of the
claims of the plaintiffs.
Of great significance is the fact that except for a misinterpretation of a finding of the Industrial Commission by this
court none of the three issues would have been before the court
in that case:
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The major difficulty in this case stems
from the fact that the Commission found that
the claimant had a pre-existing psychological
condition relating to pain in her back, which
combined with this accident resulted in permanent partial disability of 30 percent, 10
percent attributable to the pre-existing
condition and the other 20 percent to this
accident.
The claimant's testimony and the
medical report provide support for that
finding; and, since the latter also indicates
that continued psychiatric treatment may lead
to further significant improvement in the
claimant's condition, the Commission reserved
its final determination of the plaintiff's
liability for total disability benefits until
the treatment is completed.
(emphasis added).
Int. H. Care Inc. v. Ortega, supra.
The Commission made no such finding.

The medical panel

and individual doctors and attorneys for the parties talked of
such percentages but the record in that case clearly shows that
the Findings and Order of the Commission reserved, pending the
outcome of the psychiatric treatment and further psychiatric
evaluation, the issues pertaining to permanent partial disability compensation.
This Court correctly acknowledged in the above quoted
paragraph of Ortega that the Commission reserved its final
determination until the treatment is completed but then ignored
that fact by apportioning compensation and medical expenses
contrary to Section 35-l-69, U.C.A. 1953.

That section reads

in part:
If any employee who has previouslv incurred a permanent incapacity by accid~ntal
injury, disease or congenital causes, sustains
an industrial injury.
.that results in permanent incapacity which is substantiallv
greater than he would have incurred if he had
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not had the pre-existing incapacity, compensation and medical care.
.shall be
awarded on the basis of the combined injuries,
(emphasis added).
The errors made in Ortega were timely called to the
attention of the court in a Petition for Rehearing and for
Clarification but denial for rehearing was made without the
Petition being reviewed.
Another statement of the problems raised by Ortega in our
second injury fund law is made by the Industrial Commission in
its Denial of Motion for Review (R-107) Christenson record.
~ot

all the problems raised by Ortega are

this combined case.

be~ore

~s

in

One particularly disturbing rul1ng was made

in awarding Ortega compensation for a pre-existing disa£ility
that surely was not shown to be permanent.

There cannot be an

apportionment value placed on a non-permanent, illusory and nondefinable possible ailment under the Utah statute or any other
second injury statute in the United States.
Regardless of whether certain issues were before the court
in Ortega the rulings of that case were a complete departure from
established

workmen~

compensation law and procedure and from past

decisions of this court.

See Evans v. Industrial Commission,

28 Ut 2 324, 502 P.2 118. Ortega will also, as evidenced by this
combined case, and numerous other cases in the wings and some
already before this court, cause a flood of litigation that will
haunt the law in this field for years to come unless corrected.
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POINT II.
TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY IS NOT APPORTIONABLE
The general rule, and from our research the only rule, is
that "the full responsibility rule applies to temporary total
disability even in a state which permits apportionment of
permanent partial disability."
Law, Vol. 2 Sec. 59.10

(264).

Larsons Workmen's Compensation
The "full responsibility" rule im-

poses liability for the entire resulting disability upon the
employer.
Section 35-1-69, supra, speaks only of permanent incapacity and there is no mention of temporary total incapacity or
disability.

Section 69 comes into play only when there has

been a determination of permanent partial (or permanent total)
disability by the commission.
The reason for the general application of this principal
of full responsibility for temporary disability in all states is
not hard to see.

If temporary total is a subject of apportion-

ment every case involving pre-existing condition which has heretofore been paid by the carrier without controversy will be
thrust into litigation.

This will cost a great deal more to

administer and the real looser will likely be the employee.

It

would be necessary to have a medical panel in each such case.
and it should be noted that the special
of the panel.

fL~d

pays the expenses

Medical payments would be held up.

Doctors will

refuse to treat the patient because of delays in payment and
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hospitals will refuse to admit for the same reason.

In general,

total chaos will result in an area that for many years has been
an orderly system.
At the present time one percent of approximately 50,000
workmen's compensation cases per year are litigated.

Under

plaintiffs interpertation of what Ortega does that figure would
multiply drastically.
This court in Woldberg v. Industrial Commission, 74 UL 309
states that the workmen's compensation act provides a plain,
speedy and adequate method of review.

If temporary total dis-

ability payments were apportionable the procedure would not be
plain, speedy or adequate.
Temporary total compensation has never been the subject
of apportionment in this state before Ortega.

Another interest-

ing aspect of this matter is that although the plaintiffs' in
this case all cite Ortega as the reason for claiming apportionment of temporary total payments the court did not award ternporary total compensation and specifically stated that the amount
of this

(temporary total compensation) award is not challanged

by the plaintiff.
Based on a medical panel's report the
commission found that the claimant was temporarily totally disabled from November 12,
1970 to February ll, 1971, and again from
November 8, 1973 to November 11, 1973. The
commission awarded the claimant $559.54 in
benefits for those two periods.
The amount
of this award is not challenged bv the
plaintiff. (emphasis added).
Later in the opinion the court addressed itself to payment
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of temporary total disability compensation and specifically
approved the action of the commission in ordering that ternporary total compensation be paid by the carrier.
The plaintiff's assertion that "the
claimant is not entitled to temporary
total disability during medical treatment
is patently unsound.
Such benefits are
intended to compensate a workman during
the period of healing and until he is able
to return to work, usually when released
for that purpose by his doctor.
. We
observed that compensation is not necessarily awardable simply because it is
desirable or advisable for her to continue psychiatric therapy, but it is
properly awardable only during actual inability to work which is found to have been
caused by and is properly attributable to
the indust'rial accident. 'Under the circumstances here shown the Commission was
justified in ordering that temporary
total disability compensation continue during the time she is disabled and until she
is released for work by her doctor.
(emphasis added).
Ortega, supra.
POINT III.
MEDICAL EXPENSES ARE NOT APPORTIONABLE DURING TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY.
The apportionment of medical expenses during the period
of temporary total disability raises all of the problems associated with the apportionment of temporary total compensation.
There is a dearth of court decisions in this area.

Undoubtedly

the reason is that in Utah as well as other jurisdictions both
the law and the impracticality of administration have dictated
that medical expenses are not apportionable during temoorary
total disability.
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Before Ortega, medical expense was paid entirely by
the carrier or employer,

a practice that has prevailed for

all of the years of workme:ITs compensation law in this state.
If medical expense is subject to apportionment then the carriers
will deny more claims and throw more claims into litigation. Such
a practice will be more costly to the State and it will certainly
delay the payment of compensation and medical expenses.
35-1-69 supra, provides for medical expenses to be
apportioned after a determination has been made of permanent
incapacity.

That section is triggered only when permanent in-

capacity is determined by the commission and after a finding by
a medical panel.
It should also be noted that under 35-1-80 U.C.A. 1953,
the Industrial Commission has the statutory authority to award
medical expenses, in ordinary cases, which may in the judgment
of the commission be just.
POINT IV.
"SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER" UNDER 35-1-69 U.C.A. MEANS
SOMETHING MORE THAN A "DEFINITE AND MEASURABLE"
PORTION OF THE CAUSATION OF THE DISABILITY.
The legislative amendment to section 69 in 1963 would be
a useless jesture if some meaning were not attached to "substantially" being added to the word "greater."
In 1963 Section 35-1-69 was amended.

It previously read:

If any employee who has previously
incurred permanent partial disability
incurs a subsequent permanent partial disabilitv such that the compensation payable
for th~ disability resulting from the
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combined injuries is greater than the compensation which, except for the pre-existing disability would have been payable for
the latter injury, the employee shall receive compensation on the basis of the
combined injuries, but the liability of his
employer shall be for t~e latter injury only
and the remainder shall be paid out of the
special fund.
(emphasis added).
It is readily seen that for the compensation to be greater
the pre-existing disability must be greater.

So when the word

substantially is added to the word greater the legislature
certainly intended something significantly more than just greater.
Plaintiffs,

in the language of Ortega, argue that "sub-

stantially greater" means only that which is definite and
measurable.

One percent is definite and measurable but certainly

it is not substantially greater as contemplated under section 69.
Five percent is the least amount of percentage used by the
commission and Utah doctors in evaluating disability in workmens
compensation cases.

Can we say that five percent, the smallest

figure used to show disability, is a figure which is "substantially
greater?"
If such a definition were to be used it is difficult to
visualize any industrial accident case in which the carrier would
not endeavor to show a pre-existing incapacity.

And if the

criteria be that it be definite and measurable there would be few
employees who would not qualify.

For example it could, and would,

be argued that age is a definite and measurable portion of causation of disability in every case of a disabled older worker who
comes before the commission.

And what person, regardless of age,
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does not have a "pre-existing incapacity" of at least five percent or ten percent or more?
Webster's New International Dictionary, Unabridged second
edition, in defining one of the important definitions of the word
"substantial" is: considerable in amount, value, or the like; large;
as a substantial gain: important, essential, material.
The following cases used that definition in defining
substantial:

In re Teed's Estate, 247 P.2d

54 at 58, a Califor-

nia case; Levenson v. U.S., 157 F. Supp. 244 at 250, an Alabama
case; Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Magruder, 34 F. Supp. 199 at 202
a Maryland case; and Carter v. Vecchione, 133 A.2d 297 at 300,
a Pennsylvania case.

As "substantially greater'' is used in

section 69 we can find no relevance to it being simply definite
and measurable.
The concept of second injury fund law is to encourage the
hiring of those employees with a permanent pre-existing incapacity when otherwise they might not be employed because of the
potential liability to the employer.

But there was a "deductable"

clause attached so that all pre-existing conditions would not be
apportionable.

And that deductable clause includes "substantially

greater", prior, and permanent.

These conditions must be met

before apportionment is to be made.

Orteqa seemed to ignore all

these conditions.
Few phrases have been so reiterated by this court concerning cases involving the Industrial Commission than that the
rulings of the commission should be upheld if it were possible
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to arrive at such a conclusion from the facts of the case.

Can

we now say that the commission has been in error for over 40
years in their interpertation of the word greater and for 15
years in their interpretation of substantially greater?

See Evans

v. Industrial Commission, supra.
FURTHER ARGUMENTS ON THE INDIVIDUAL CASES
The arguments made thus far have application to all three
of the combined cases.

There are factual differences in each of

the cases which should be noted.
PATRICIA H. WHITE vs. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
This employee began working for Saint Benedict's Hospital
in September of 1966.

The record indicates some previous back

problems before working for the hospital.

However, since work-

ing at St. Benedicts she was hospitalized in 1967 for back
problems; surgery was performed in 1971 for decompression of
L-4 and L-5; hospitalized in 1974 for back problems and in addition had numerous occassions to consult doctors concerning back
problems during this period of 1966 to the time of the industrial
accident in 1976.

(R-50).

She incurred an industrial accident

on May 6, 1976 while working at the hospital.

She underwent

surgery in December 1976, and a lamenectomy decompression of L-4
and L-5 with wide bilateral root decompression and excision of
herniated L-4 disc was performed.
During this entire period from 1966 to the accident at
the hospital in May 6, 1976, Mrs. White was working for the same
employer.
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The medical panel met in August of 1977 and concluded the
claimant had a twenty percent impairment from all causes; five
percent from the industrial accident and fifteen percent from
pre-existing conditions.

The panel also stated:

The degenerated disc has now been removed which was giving trouble and could
have given serious trouble recurrently
prior to the industrial injury, and to
some extent the patient is better off by
having this condition taken care of and
stabilized. (emphasis added). (R-238)
The commission, because of these facts, stated that
section 31-l-69, supra, did not apply.

That section requires

the claimant be worse off after the industrial accident than
before the accident.

The "results" of the pre-existing incapa-

city plus the industrial injury cannot be the same as or less
than that percentage of disability taking either separately.
Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, 59.32 (10-315) states
as the general rule:
When the final disability is exclusively
the result of the pre-existing condition the
second injury fund is not liable, since there
is no tie-in with a compensable injury.
There is ample evidence in the record to support the
ruling of the commission that Mrs. White is as well off today or
perhaps even better off in terms of disability than before the
industrial accident of 1976.

The surgery performed after the

industrial accident helped stabilize long standing difficulties.
The pleadings do not indicate White seeks temporary total
compensation.

However, all of the previous

decisions relative
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to apportionment of medicial expenses and "substantially greater"
are pertinent to the White case.
PARIS COMPANY AND STATE INSURANCE FUND vs. INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION AND J. BRENT CHRISTENSON.
Brent Christenson was injured in December, 1972, while
lifting boxes at the Paris Company.
result of that injury.

He made no claim as a

He was again injured in August of 1974

while again lifting boxes for the Paris Company.

In January of

1976 a spinal fusion was performed "as a direct result of the
episode of August 1974, as well as repeated insults to his back
both before and after the alleged accident." Panel Report (R-79).
Christensen testified that since the surgical operation
he has no problems at the present time with his back.

(R-33).

The medical panel felt that there was a pre-existing incapacity attributable to conditions before the August, 1974
accident of five percent.

They said the percentage of physical

impairment attributed to the industrial injury of August, 1974,
is five percentIt is noted that five percent increments is the least
percentage disability that is awarded by our medical panels. Five
percent is surely not "substantially greater" than if there had
been no pre-existing incapacity.
Another factor that would preclude involvement of 35-1-69
supra, in this case is the Statute of Limitations in section
35-1-99 U.C.A. 1953 which reads in part:
If no claim for compensation is filed with
the industrial commission within three years
from the date of the accident or the date of the
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-1 ,_

last payment of compensation, the rjght
to compensation shall be wholly barred.
The commission in commenting upon this section said:
Wit~out belaboring other considerations,
the commlssion is of the opinion that the combined injury fund is not responsible for a
claim that is otherwise barred by the statute
of limitations.

The Paris Company cannot now cause the fund to be responsible for apportionment of compensation which claimant is
barred from pursuing because of the statute of limitations.
The commission had substantial evidence in the record to
sustain their ruling that 35-1-69 supra, does not

a~ply

in this

case.
t:EBO SCHOOL DISTRICT AND STATE INSURANCE FUND vs.
JOAN CRAGUN AND THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
As the carriers in this case are endeavoring to protect
themselves against possible future medicals and possible future
temporary total compensation that may become due after exhausting
the amount of the third party settlement it is questionable if
these carriers are rightly before this court.
Second Injury Fund Pay
and Future

Tempora~y

See Motion to have

Proportionate Share of Future Medicals

Total Benefits.

(R-374).

If, however, the carriers have an arguable position in
the possible future liability of the second injury found, then:
1.

Future medical expenses not associated with tern-

porary total disability is apportionable under section 35-1-69
as earlier stated.
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2.

Temporary total, whether past or future, is not

apportionable, as previously argued.
3.

Ten percent pre-existing incapacity is not sub-

stantially greater as previously argued.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs on Appeal in these three cases base their entire argument on

~ntermountain

Health Care Inc. v. Ortega, supra.

This argument must fall for the following reasons:
1.

Ortega rulings were based on false presumption that

the commission had made a finding of permanent partial disability
when in fact the commission had specifically reserved that issue
because of treatment being received and which showed promise of
successfully curing or reducing her disability.
2.

Apportionment of temporary total disability was not

a ruling of Ortega and was specifically not apportioned in that
case.
3.

Section 35-1-69 allows apportionment of medical ex-

penses only after a determination of permanent partial disability.
4.

The records in each of the cases provide substantial

evidence to support the commissions findings that section 35-1-69
is not applicable to allow the apportionment of temporary total
disability compensation, past or future, nor to allow apportionment of medical expenses incurred before a determination of permanent partial disability.
The rulings of th€ Industrial Commission soulc be affirmed.
DATED this..f7

~ay

of December, 1978.
-~
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